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Abstract
Online reviews play a crucial role in deciding the
quality before purchasing any product. Unfortu-
nately, spammers often take advantage of online
review forums by writing fraud reviews to pro-
mote/demote certain products. It may turn out to
be more detrimental when such spammers collude
and collectively inject spam reviews as they can
take complete control of users’ sentiment due to the
volume of fraud reviews they inject. Group spam
detection is thus more challenging than individual-
level fraud detection due to unclear definition of a
group, variation of inter-group dynamics, scarcity
of labeled group-level spam data, etc. Here, we
propose DeFrauder, an unsupervised method to de-
tect online fraud reviewer groups. It first detects
candidate fraud groups by leveraging the underly-
ing product review graph and incorporating sev-
eral behavioral signals which model multi-faceted
collaboration among reviewers. It then maps re-
viewers into an embedding space and assigns a
spam score to each group such that groups compris-
ing spammers with highly similar behavioral traits
achieve high spam score. While comparing with
five baselines on four real-world datasets (two of
them were curated by us), DeFrauder shows supe-
rior performance by outperforming the best base-
line with 17.11% higher NDCG@50 (on average)
across datasets.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, online reviews are becoming highly important for
customers to take any purchase-related decisions. Driven by
the immense financial profits from product reviews, several
blackmarket syndicates facilitate to post deceptive reviews to
promote/demote certain products. Groups of such fraud re-
viewers are hired to take complete control of the sentiment
about products. Collective behaviour is therefore more sub-
tle than individual behaviour. At individual level, activities
might be normal; however, at the group level they might be
substantively different from the normal behavior. Moreover,
it is not possible to understand the actual dynamics of a group
by aggregating the behaviour of its members due to the com-
plicated, multi-faceted, and evolving nature of inter-personal
dynamics. Spammers in such collusive groups also adopt
intelligent strategies (such as paraphrasing reviews of each
other, employing a subset of their resources to one product,
etc.) to evade detection.
Previous studies mostly focused on individual-level fraud
detection [Lim et al., 2010; Fei et al., 2013; Akoglu et al.,
2013]. Few other studies which realized the detrimental effect
of such collective activities detected groups simply based on
Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM) [Mukherjee et al., 2012; Xu
et al., 2013; Allahbakhsh et al., 2013]. They thus focused
more on ranking fraud groups, paying less attention to judge
the quality of the detected groups.
[Wang et al., 2016] pointed out several limitations of FIM
for group detection – high computational complexity at low
minimum support, absence of temporal information, unable
to capture overlapping groups, prone to detect small and
tighter groups, etc.
In this paper, we propose DeFrauder1, a novel architecture
for fraud reviewer group detection. DeFrauder contributes
equally to (i) the detection of potential fraud groups by incor-
porating several coherent behavioral signals of reviewers, and
(ii) the ranking of groups based on their degree of spamicity
by proposing a novel ranking strategy. Experiments on four
real-world labeled datasets (two of them were prepared by us)
show that DeFrauder significantly outperforms five baselines
– it beats the best baseline by 11.35% higher accuracy for
detecting groups, and 17.11% higher NDCG@50 for ranking
groups (averaged over all datasets).
In short, our contributions are fourfold: (i) two novel
datasets, (ii) novel method for reviewer group detection, (iii)
novel method for ranking groups, and (iv) a comprehensive
evaluation to show the superiority of DeFrauder.
2 Related Work
Due to the abundance of literature [Kou et al., 2004] on on-
line fraud detection, we restrict our discussion to fraud user
detection on product review sites, which we deem as pertinent
to this paper.
1DeFrauder: Detecting Fraud Reviewer Groups, Code is avail-
able in [Dhawan et al.].
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Figure 1: (a) Workflow of DeFrauder. (b) Coherent review patterns of a fraud reviewer group on two products. To evade detection, four
reviewers in a group paraphrase reviews of each other keeping the underlying sentiment same.
In user-level fraud detection, notable studies include [Lim
et al., 2010] which proposed scoring methods to measure
the degree of spamicity of a reviewer based on rating be-
haviors; [Wang et al., 2011] which developed a graph-based
fraud reviewer detection model; [Fei et al., 2013] which ex-
ploited burstiness in reviews to detect fake reviewers. SpEa-
gle [Akoglu et al., 2013] utilizes clues from all metadata as
well as relational data and harnesses them collectively under a
unified framework. ASM [Mukherjee et al., 2013a] facilitates
modeling spamicity as latent factor and allows to exploit var-
ious behavioral footprints of reviewers. [Wang et al., 2012]
argued that the dynamic behavioral signals can be captured
through a heterogeneous reviewer graph by considering re-
viewers, reviews and products together. FraudEagle [Akoglu
et al., 2013] spots fraudsters and fake reviews simultaneously.
[Dutta et al., 2018; Chetan et al., 2019] discussed about col-
lusion in social media.
Few studies attempted to detect group-level fraud reviewer
groups. GSRank [Mukherjee et al., 2012] was the first
method of this kind, which identifies spam reviewer groups
using FIM, and ranks groups based on the relationship among
groups, products, and individual reviewers. [Mukherjee et al.,
2012] argued that due to the scarcity of data, unsupervised
method should be used to tackle this problem. Other studies
largely focused on improving the ranking algorithm, ignor-
ing the performance of the group detection method (they also
used FIM for detecting groups) [Xu et al., 2013; Allahbakhsh
et al., 2013; Mukherjee et al., 2013b; Ott et al., 2011]. [Xu
and Zhang, 2015] proposed an Expectation Maximization al-
gorithm to compute the collusive score of each group detected
using FIM. [Wang et al., 2016] argued that FIM tends to de-
tect small-size and tighter groups. They proposed GSBP, a
divide-and-conquer algorithm which emphasizes on the topo-
logical structure of the reviewer graph. GGSpam [Wang et
al., 2018b] directly generates spammer groups consisting of
group members, target products, and spam reviews.
We propose DeFrauder that leverages temporal pattern,
content similarity and underlying graph structure to detect
collusive fraud groups in review forums (see Table 1 for a
comparison). Unlike others, DeFrauder contributes equally
to both the components – group detection and ranking.
GSBP GGSpam GSRank DeFrauder
Temporal X X X X
Content X X
Graph X X X
Table 1: DeFrauder captures all three signals obtained from users
attributes and underlying graph structure.
3 Proposed DeFrauder Framework
In this section, we explain DeFrauder which is a three-
stage algorithm – detecting candidate fraud groups, measur-
ing different fraud indicators of candidate groups, and rank-
ing groups based on the group spam score.
3.1 Group Fraud Indicators
Here we present six fraud indicators which measure the spam-
icity of a group [Mukherjee et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2018b,
2016] by taking into account linguistic, behavioral, structural
and temporal signals. All indicators are normalized to [0, 1] –
larger value indicates more spamming activity. Let R and P
be the entire set of reviewers and products. Let R(g) be the
set of reviewers in a group g, and P (g) be the set of target
products reviewed by the reviewers in R(g). Each reviewer i
reviewed a set of products Pi.
To reduce the contingency of small groups, we use a
penalty function L(g) which is a logistic function Wang et
al. [2016]: L(g) = 1/(1 + e-(|R(g)|+|P (g)|-3)). We subtract 3
from the sum since we consider minimum number of review-
ers and products within a group to be 2 and 1, respectively;
therefore L(g) ∈ [0.5, 1) Wang et al. [2018a].
Review tightness(RT). It is the ratio of the number of re-
views in g (assuming each reviewer is allowed to write one
review to each product) to the product of the size of reviewer
set and product set in g.
RT (g) =
∑
i∈R(g) |Pi|
|R(g)||P (g)| · L(g) (1)
If significant proportion of people co-reviewed several prod-
ucts, then it may imply a spam group activity.
Neighbor tightness(NT). It is defined as the average value
of the Jaccard similarity (JS) of the product sets of each re-
viewer pair.
NT (g) =
∑
i,j∈R(g) JS(Pi, Pj)(|R(g)|
2
) · L(g) (2)
If the product sets are highly similar, both the reviewers are
then highly likely to be together in a collusive group.
Product tightness(PT). It is the ratio of the number of
common products to the number of products reviewed by all
the members in g Wang et al. [2016].
PT (g) =
|⋂i∈R(g) Pi|
|⋃i∈R(g) Pi|L(g) (3)
Group members reviewing certain number of products and
not reviewing any other products are more likely to indulge
in fraud activities.
Rating variance(RV). Group spammers tend to give sim-
ilar ratings while reviewing any product. Let S2(p, g) be
the variance of the rating scores of product p by reviewers in
g. We take the average variance for all target products. The
variance degree [0.5, 1) is converted into spam score between
(0, 1].
RV (g) = 2L(g)
(
1− 1
1 + e−
∑
p∈P (g) S2(p,g)
|P (g)|
)
(4)
Product reviewer ratio(RR). It is defined as the maximum
value of the ratio of the number of reviewers in R(g) who
reviewed product p ∈ P (g) to the number of all the reviewers
of p, denoted by |Rev(p)|:
RR(g) = max
p∈P (g)
∑
i∈R(g){1 : p ∈ Pi}
|Rev(p)| (5)
If a product is mainly reviewed by the reviewers in g, then the
group is highly likely to be a spammer group.
Time window(TW). Fraudsters in a group are likely to post
fake reviews during a short-time interval. Given a group g,
and a product p ∈ Pg , we define the time-window based
spamicity as
TW (g, p) =
{
1− SDpT , if SDp <= T
0, SDp > T
TW (g) =
∑
pPg TW (g, p)
|P (g)| · L(g), (6)
where SDp is the standard deviation of review time for a
product p reviewed by reviewers in group g. T is a time
threshold (set to 30 days in our experiments as suggested in
Wang et al. [2018b]).
Algorithm 1 ExtractGroups
1: Initialize:
2: CCgroups← set() . Set of candidate groups
3: G(V,E)← Edge attributed graph
4: CSet← {} . Potential merged groups
5: G,CCgroups← GroupDetector(G,CCgroups)
6: Iterate:
7: G′(V ′, E′)← Attributed line graph of G
8: G′, CCgroups = GroupDetector(G′, CCgroups)
9: G← G′
10: until |E| > 1
11: return CCgroups
12: function GROUPDETECTOR(G,CCgroups)
13: for each isolated node vi in G do
14: CCgroups.add(vi) and remove vi from G
15: for each pair (ei, ej) ∈ E × E do
16: if aei ⊂ aej then
17: if
⋂
m∈ae
j
Pm⋃
m∈ae
j
Pm
> 0.5 then
18: CSet(aei ) = CSet(a
e
i ) ∪ aej
19: else
20: if
⋂
m∈{ae
j
\ae
i
} Pm⋃
m∈{ae
j
\ae
i
} Pm
> 0.5 then
21: CCgroups.add(aej \ aei )
22: for each ei ∈ E do
23: k=CSet(aei )
24: CCgroups.add(k) and remove k from G
25: for each connected component c with |c| > 2 do
26: CCgroups.add(c) and remove c from G
27: for each group g ∈ CCgroups do
28: if CollectiveScore(g) <= τspam then
29: CCgroups.remove(g)
30: return G,CCgroups
3.2 Detection of Candidate Fraud Groups
We propose a novel graph-based candidate group detection
method based on the “coherence principle”.
Hypothesis 1 (Coherence Principle) Fraudsters in a group
are coherent in terms of – (a) the products they review, (b)
ratings they give to the products, and (c) the time of reviewing
the products.
We show that each component of this hypothesis is statis-
tically significant (see Sec. 5). We incorporate these three
factors into a novel attributed product-product graph con-
struction – G(V,E) such that each vij ∈ V indicates a
product-rating pair (pi, rj) and its attribute avij consists of the
set of reviewers who rated pi with rj . An edge e(ij,mn) =
〈uij , vmn〉 ∈ E indicates the co-reviewing and co-rating pat-
terns of two products pi and pm with rating rj and rn, re-
spectively. The edge attribute ae(ij,mn) indicates the set of co-
reviewers R(ij,mn) who reviewed both pi and pm and gave
same ratings rj and rn respectively within the same time τt
(defined in Sec. 3.3). Note that edge e(ij,in) connecting same
product with different ratings wont exist in G as we assume
that a reviewer is not allowed to give multiple reviews/ratings
to a single product.
We then propose ExtractGroups (pseudecode in
Algo 1, a toy example in Supplementary [Dhawan et al.]), a
novel group detection algorithm that takes G as an input and
executes a series of operations through GroupDetector()
(Line 12) – isolated nodes are first removed (Lines 13-14),
edge attributes are then merged and removed if Jaccard sim-
ilarity (JS) of product sets that the corresponding reviewers
reviewed is greater than a threshold (set as 0.5). Any group
of reviewers eliminated due to the consideration of only com-
mon reviewers during the creation of edges is also checked
through JS in order to avoid loosing any potential candidate
groups (Lines 15-24). Before proceeding to the next iteration,
connected components containing more than two nodes are
removed (Lines 25-26). We define CollectiveScore as the
average of six group level indicators defined in Sec. 3.1, and
consider those as potential groups whose CollectiveScore
exceeds τspam (Lines 27-29, defined in Sec. 5.2).
It then converts the remaining structure of G into an at-
tributed line graph (edges converted into vertices and vice
versa) G′(V ′, E′) as follows: v′(ij,mn) ∈ V ′ corresponds to
e(ij,mn) in G and av
′
(ij,mn) = a
e
(ij,mn); an edge e
′
(ij,mn,ab) =
〈v′(ij,mn), v′(ij,ab)〉 represents co-reviewing and co-rating pat-
terns of products pi, pm and pa; the corresponding edge at-
tribute is a(ij,mn,ab) = ae(ij,mn) ∩ ae(ij,ab). G′ is again fed
into GroupDetector in the next iteration. Essentially, in
each iteration, we keep clubbing reviewers together, who ex-
hibit coherent reviewing patterns. The iteration continues un-
til none of the edges remain in the resultant graph, and a set
of candidate fraud groups are returned.
The worst case time complexity of ExtractGroups is
O(k|E|2), where k is the number of iterations, and |E| is the
number of edges in G (see Supplementary [Dhawan et al.]
for more details).
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem of convergence)
ExtractGroups will converge within a finite number of
iterations.
See Supplementary [Dhawan et al.] for the proof.
3.3 Ranking of Candidate Fraud Groups
Once candidate fraud groups are detected, DeFrauder ranks
these groups based on their spamicity. It involves two steps –
mapping reviewers into an embedding space based on their
co-reviewing patterns, and ranking groups based on how
close the constituent reviewers are in the embedding space.
Reviewer2Vec: Embedding Reviewers
Our proposed embedding method, Reviewer2Vec is moti-
vated by [Wang et al., 2018b]. Given two reviewers i and j
co-reviewing a product p ∈ P by writing reviews cip and cjp
with the rating rip and r
j
p at time t
i
p and t
j
p respectively, we
define the collusive spamicity of i, j w.r.t. p as:
Coll(i, j, p) =
{
0, |tpi − tpj | > τt ∨ |rpi − rpj | ≥ τr
ζ(i, j, p), otherwise
(7)
where,
ζ(i, j, p) =sp
[
α
(
1− |t
i
p − tjp|
τt
)
+ β
(
1− |r
i
p − rjp|
τr
)
+ γ.Cosine(cip, c
j
p)
]
Where sp = 2
1+e
−(max
q∈P Rev(q)−Rev(p))
θ+2θ
−1. Coefficients α, β
and γ control the importance of time, rating and the similarity
of review content, respectively (0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1 and α+β+
γ = 1). We set γ > α, β as same review content signifies
more collusion as compared to the coherence in ratings and
time [Wang et al., 2018b].
sp is the degree of suspicion of product p. τt, τr and θ are
the parameters of the model. If the posting time difference
among reviewers i and j on p is beyond τt or their rating on
p deviates beyond τr (where τr = (max−min)x%, where
max and min are the maximum and minimum ratings that a
product can achieve respectively), we do not consider this co-
reviewing pattern. ExtractGroups achieves best results
with τt = 20 and τr = (max−min)20% (see Sec. 5.3).
ζ(i, j, p) is the collusiveness between two reviewers w.r.t.
product p they co-reviewed; however there might be other
reviewers who reviewed p as well. Lesser the number of re-
viewers of p, more is the probability that i and j colluded.
This factor is handled by sp after passing it through a sigmoid
function. θ is a normalizing factor which ranges between
[0, 1] (set as 0.4 [Wang et al., 2018b]). We take the cosine
similarly of two reviews cip and c
j
p after mapping them into
embedding space using Word2Vec [Mikolov et al., 2013].
Combining the collusive spamicity of a pair of reviewers
across all the products they co-reviewed, we obtain the overall
collusive spamicity between two reviewers:
Φ(i, j) =
2
1 + e−σ(i,j)
− 1
where σ(i, j) =
[ ∑
p∈{Pi∩Pj}
Coll(i, j, p)
]
|Pi ∩ Pj |
|Pi ∪ Pj |
We then create a reviewer-reviewer spammer graph [Wang
et al., 2018b] which is a bi-connected and weighted graph
Gs = (Vs, Es), where Vs corresponds to the set of reviewers
R, and two reviewers i and j are connected by an edge esij ∈
Es with the weight W sij = Φ(i, j). Once Gs is created, we
use state-of-the-art node embedding method to generate node
(reviewer) embeddings (see Sec. 5.3).
Ranking Groups
For each detected group, we calculate the density of the group
based on (Euclidean) distance of each reviewer in the group
with the group’s centroid in the embedding space. An aver-
age of all distances is taken as a measure of spamicity of the
group. Let~i be the vector representation of reviewer i in the
embedding space. The group spam score Spam(g) of group
g is measured as:
Spam(g) =
1
|R(g)|
∑
i∈R(g)
[
~i−
[ 1
|R(g)|
∑
i∈R(g)
~i
]]2
(8)
Dataset # Reviews # Reviewers # Products
YelpNYC 359052 160225 923
YelpZIP 608598 260227 5044
Amazon 10261 1429 900
Playstore 325424 321436 192
Table 2: Statistics of four datasets.
4 Datasets
We collected four real-world datasets – YelpNYC: ho-
tel/restaurant reviews of New York city Rayana and Akoglu
[2015]; YelpZip: aggregation of reviews on restau-
rants/hotels from a number of areas with continuous zip codes
starting from New York city Rayana and Akoglu [2015];
Amazon: reviews on musical instruments He and McAuley
[2016], and Playstore: reviews of different applications
available on Google Playstore. Fake reviews and spammers
are already marked in both the Yelp datasets Rayana and
Akoglu [2015]. For the remaining datasets, we employed
three human experts2 to label spammers based on the in-
structions mentioned in Shojaee et al. [2015]; Mukherjee et
al. [2013a]3. The inter-rater agreement was 0.81 and 0.79
(Fleiss’ multi-rater kappa) for Amazon and Playstore, respec-
tively. Table 2 shows the statistics of the datasets.
5 Experimental Results
Statistical validation. To measure the statistical signifi-
cance of each component (say, products reviewed by the
group members) of Hypothesis 1 (Sec. 3.2), we randomly
generate pairs of reviewers (irrespective of the groups they
belong to) and measure how their co-reviewing patterns (cu-
mulative distribution) are different from the case if a pair of
reviewers co-occur together in the same group. We hypoth-
esize that both these patterns are different (whereas null hy-
pothesis rejects our hypothesis). We observe that the differ-
ence is statistically significant as p < 0.01 (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). See Supplementary Dhawan et al. for more
discussion. We then perform evaluation in two stages – qual-
ity of the detected groups, and quality of the ranking algo-
rithms.
5.1 Baseline Methods
We consider three existing methods (see Sec. 2 for their
details) as baselines for both the evaluations – (i) GSBP
Wang et al. [2016],(ii)GGSpamWang et al. [2018b],and (iii)
GSRank Mukherjee et al. [2012].
5.2 Evaluating Candidate Groups
Along with the three baselines mentioned above, we also
consider two variations of DeFrauder as baselines for group
detection: DeFrauderR constructs the attributed product-
product graph G based only on co-rating without consider-
ing the time of reviewing; and DeFrauderT constructs G
2They were social media experts, and their age ranged between
25-35.
3https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
10-secrets-to-uncovering-which-online-reviews-are-fake-2018-09-21
Figure 2: CDF of (a) GS and (b) RCS for YelpNYC. The more the
distance of a CDF (corresponding to a method) from y-axis, the bet-
ter the performance of the method.
based only on same co-reviewing time without considering
co-rating. This also helps in justifying why both time and
rating are important in constructing G for group detection.
Mukherjee et al. [2012] suggested to use cumulative distribu-
tion (CDF) of group size (GS) and review content similarity
(RCS) to evaluate the quality of the spam groups. Here we
discard groups with size less than 2. Group Size (GS) favors
large fraud groups as large groups are more damaging than
smaller ones: GS(g) = 1
1+e-(|R(g)|−2) . Review Content Sim-
ilarity (RCS) captures inter-reviewer review content similar-
ity (as spammers copy reviews of each other): RCS(g) =
maxp∈P (g){ 1|R(g)|2
∑
(i,j)∈R(g)×R(g) cosine(c
i
p, c
j
p)}.
The larger the deviation of each distribution from the
vertical axis (measured in terms of Earth Mover’s Dis-
tance (EMD)), the better the quality of the detected method
Mukherjee et al. [2012].
Comparison. We choose the following parameter values as
default based on our parameter selection strategy (Fig. 4): τt:
20 days, τspam = 0.4. The number of groups we obtain from
different datasets is reported in Table 3. Fig. 2 shows the
CDF of GS and RCS for all the competing methods on Yelp-
NYC4, which is further summarized quantitatively (in terms
of EMD) in Table 3. DeFrauder outperforms the best baseline
by 11.35% and 4.67% higher relative EMD (averaged over
four datasets) for GS and RCS, respectively. We also notice
that DeFrauderT performs better than DeFrauderR, indicating
that temporal coherence is more important than rating coher-
ence in detecting potential groups.
5.3 Evaluating Ranking Algorithm
We use NDCG@k, a standard graded evaluation met-
ric. Since each reviewer was labeled as fraud/genuine,
we consider the graded relevance value (ground-truth rele-
vance score used in Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain
(NDCG) Manning et al. [2010]) for each group as the fraction
of reviewers in a group, who are marked as fraud. The candi-
date groups are then ranked by each competing method, and
top k groups are judged based on NDCG.
Comparison. We choose the following parameter values as
default based on our parameter selection strategy (Fig. 4):
4Results are similar on the other datasets, and thus omitted.
Method YelpNYC YelpZIP Amazon Playstore|G| GS RCS ND |G| GS RCS ND |G| GS RCS ND |G| GS RCS ND
GGSpam 1218 0.574 0.218 0.567 1167 0.629 0.219 0.563 144 0.131 0.250 0.230 1213 0.749 0.010 0.464
GSBP 809 0.562 0.173 0.521 807 0.478 0.265 0.520 115 0.416 0.260 0.689 250 0.744 0.016 0.474
GSRank 998 0.102 0.313 0.569 1223 0.132 0.054 0.706 2922 0.293 0.309 0.144 994 0.577 0.018 0.476
DeFrauderR 4399 0.124 0.021 — 6815 0.139 0.031 — 197 0.234 0.290 — 385 0.372 0.005 —
DeFrauderT 152 0.237 0.069 — 3666 0.648 0.271 — 807 0.698 0.207 — 200 0.458 0.007 —
DeFrauder 1118 0.731 0.348 0.603 4574 0.667 0.287 0.602 713 0.718 0.314 0.768 940 0.841 0.018 0.789
Table 3: Performance of the competing methods: GGSpam Wang et al. [2018b], GSBP Wang et al. [2016], GSRank Mukherjee et al. [2012],
DeFrauderR, DeFrauderT, and DeFrauder. Number of groups detected (|G|) are mentioned after removing groups of size less than 2 (cyan
regions). Accuracy for the group detection (white regions) and ranking (gray regions) is reported in terms of EMD (the higher, the better),
and NDCG@50 (ND) respectively. DeFrauderR and DeFrauderT are used only for group detection. The ranking methods of all baselines are
run on the groups detection by DeFrauder.
Figure 3: Performance on YelpNYC. Baselines are run with their de-
tected groups as well as with the groups (+D) detected by DeFrauder
(same naming convention as in Table 3).
α = β = 0.3, γ = 0.4, τt = 20 days, τr = (max−min)20%
τspam = 0.4. We use Node2Vec Grover and Leskovec [2016]
for embedding5. Fig. 3 shows the performance of the compet-
ing methods for different values of k (top k groups returned
by each method). Since DeFrauder produces better groups
(Sec. 5.2), we also check how the ranking method of each
baseline performs on the groups detected of DeFrauder. Fig.
3 shows that with DeFrauder’s group structure, GGSpam and
GSBP show better performance than DeFrauder till k = 40;
after that DeFrauder dominates others. However, all the base-
lines perform poor with their own detected groups. This result
also indicates the efficiency of our group detection method.
Table 3 reports that DeFrauder beats other methods across all
the datasets except YelpZIP on which GSRank performs bet-
ter with DeFrauder’s detected groups. Interestingly, no single
baseline turns out to be the best baseline across datasets. Nev-
ertheless, DeFrauder outperforms the best baseline (varies
across datasets) by 17.11% higher relative NDCG@50 (av-
eraged over all the datasets).
5We tried with DeepWalk Perozzi et al. [2014] and LINE Tang
et al. [2015] and obtained worse results compared to Node2Vec.
Figure 4: Parameter selection on YelpNYC. We vary each parameter
keeping others as default. Since τt = 20 produces best results for
group detection, we kept this value for ranking as well.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of fraud reviewer group
detection in customer reviews. We established the principle
of coherence among fraud reviewers in a group in terms of
their co-reviewing patterns. This paper contributed in four
directions: Datasets: We collected and annotated two new
datasets which would be useful to the cybersecurity commu-
nity; Characterization: We explored several group-level be-
havioral traits to model inter-personal collusive dynamics in a
group; Method: We proposed DeFrauder, a novel method to
detect and rank fraud reviewer groups; Evaluation: Exhaus-
tive experiments were performed on four datasets to show the
superiority of DeFrauder compared to five baselines.
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